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Lynda

E. Boose

Crossing the River Drina: Bosnian Rape Camps, Turkish
Impalement, and Serb Cultural Memory
n February22, 2001, at the trial of three indicted war criminals from
Foca, the Hague International War Crimes Tribunal for Yugoslavia
(ICTY) concluded for the first time that rape and sexual enslavement
were violations of sufficient gravity to be considered as "crimes against
humanity" under international law. This overdue move to place sexual
crimes on the list of most serious crimes for prosecution came in the wake
of the international outrage generated by the Bosnian war, where the mass
rape and forced incarcerationof women in so-called rape camps had been
one of the chief strategies used by Serbian forces primarily against the
Muslim populations of both Bosnia and Kosovo. Thus, in what the Associated Press described as "wrenching, horrific testimony" (Associated
Press quoted in Gartenberg 2000), those Bosnian women courageous
enough to testify became symbolic speakers for the many thousands of
women who did not appear, either because they had been killed after
being raped, or because their rapistsremained unapprehended, or because
they remained silent for fear of being ostracized within their own culture.
Conservative estimates of the number of women raped during the Bosnian war run between twenty thousand and fifty thousand; what happened
in the rape camps of Bosnia includes a list of atrocities as endless as the
sadistic imagination might devise.' Throughout 1992 and 1993, truckI owe a special note of thanks to Nermina Zildzo, Nenad Filipovic, and Drazan Lapic
for sharing insights into their culture with me and to Annabelle Winograd for her invaluable
help in commenting on the manuscript.
1 The two books that have become the standard references for documented information
about rape and the Bosnian war are Stiglmayer 1994 and Allen 1996. A lesser-known but
excellent account, published in English, comes from Montenegrin journalist Seada Vranic
(1996), whose work includes the perspective of Bosnian psychologists as well as the voices
of rape victims. Additionally, see Bernard 1994; Ramet 1999; and Drakulic 2000. Recently
made available is the English translation of a text originally published in Belgrade; Vesna
Nkolic-Ristanovic's collection of essays ([1995] 2000) written by four women all from the
present Yugoslavia (the Serbian-controlled remnant of the former federal Yugoslavia) offers
a variant perspective on the Bosnian war and its particular violence against women.
By its
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loads of eastern Bosnia's Muslim women arrived in the central cities of
Travnik, Zenica, and Visoko, and from there they were taken in busloads
to the nearest hospital for abortions. Speaking of the likelihood of psychological rehabilitation for the rape victims of this war, Bosnian psychiatrist Muradis Kulenovic makes the point that even the terms by which
psychology understands the word rape are rendered grossly insufficient if
not meaningless by the experience of large numbers of Bosniak women,2
for whom rape commonly occurred within an interlinked sequence of
traumatic events in which, Kulenovic says, "the victim, prior to the rape,
had experienced the massacre of children and parents, then had to watch
the murder of her husband, who had been forced to watch the rape of
his wife. Finally,. . . terrified and probably naked, she had to flee under
a rain of bullets from her burning village, stumbling on the mangled and
charred bodies of her relatives, neighbors and friends" (quoted in Vranic
1996, 194). Under such circumstances, the term rape exceeds any context
in which traditional forms of therapy can assume its meaning.
While several decades of feminist pressure have brought at least some
change in the view of rape within North American and western European
societies, in most other cultures the way that rape is socially constructed
makes it primarily a violation defiling the male members of both the
victim's family and her community, and thus the narrative of the raped
woman has always been a text that is simply disallowed from the culture's
self-story.3Yet while this very reaction hands the invader a useful weapon
attempt to hide an evident Serbian nationalism under the guise of feminism, however, and
by its insistence throughout on a purportedly apolitical stance that wants us to read the
violence of the Bosnian war as equally suffered and enacted by all three ethnic groups, the
book exposes its unacknowledged participation in that particular discourse that seeks to
minimize the enormity of Serb responsibility by redistributing responsibility to those who
were disproportionately the war's real victims-the Bosnian Muslims. Ironically enough, by
implicitly invoking such claims, the book seizes on the same strategy that the United States
adopted during the Bosnian war as a means of glossing over the realityofvictim and victimizer
and rationalizing its own decision to avoid militaryintervention in a war that the U.S. military
hierarchy balked at entering.
2 Bosniak is the Balkan term for Bosnians who are Muslim.
3
Only a deeply entrenched patriarchalismcan explain the story of a Kosovar Albanian
family's reaction to the rape of their thirteen-year-old daughter, Pranvera,who was among
the twenty young girls raped by Serb troops who ethnically cleansed her Kosovar village in
1999 and forced the Albanians to flee in exile across the border. While for four days and
nights Pranverawas held in the basement and gang-raped, her family upstairs was held at
gunpoint and forced to listen helplessly to her screams. The battered little girl was eventually
returned to her family, but unlike the other family members, she never reached the relative
safety of the Kukes camp. Before reaching the border, this deeply loved daughter was sacrificiallysent by her father to join the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) guerrillaforces, where
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for destroying the invaded community and may in fact encourage him to
rape, even that consequence is apparently deemed preferable to the feminization of the community body implicit in the acceptance of either the
violated woman or the story for which her body is text. As a vivid illustration of how resistant cultural narrativescan prove when faced with such
undesirable histories, it is telling to note that it is only now, more than a
half century after the fact, that the national narrativesof India and Pakistan are reluctantly allowing any space at all for the suppressed stories of
the mass violation of Muslim and Hindu women that took place during
Partition.4 Likewise, only recently have the equally unwelcome stories of
the sexual enslavement that Korean, New Guinean, and other so-called
comfort women suffered at the hands of the Japanese army during World
War II finally surfaced.5 Culture has authorized only one narrative for a
woman raped by the enemy-the one of the Roman, Lucrece, that concludes with her suicide. In postwar Sarajevo,as some forty Bosnian women
survivors banded together to publish their testimonies and thereby force
them into public consciousness, the braveryof the survivors ran nearly at
cross purposes to the apologetic defensiveness implicit in the title they
gave their book, I Begged Them to Kill Me (Association of Camp Inmates-Canton Sarajevo [2000]; described in Drakulic 2001).6 Such ambivalence itself speaks volumes about the coercive interplay of gender and
cultural memory.
The rape camps of the Bosnian war have been documented as a systematically planned Serb instrument of genocide designed not merely to
encourage the evacuation of all non-Serbs but to destroy parent-child and
spousal bonds and render large numbers of the society's child-bearing
women contaminated and thus unmarriageable. As a strategic tool of
"ethnic cleansing," rape was, moreover, part of a long-range goal to undermine the ethnic mixing that had been openly encouraged in Tito's
the family fully expected her to be killed. For the parents, their daughter's life was essentially
over at the moment of her rape; and thus sending her where she might at least seek revenge
against her attackers and possibly redeem her family's (read father's) honor in death was a
fully responsible way of caring for her. See Williams 1999.
4 For what
happened on a mass scale to both Hindu and Muslim women during Partition,
see especially Butalia (1998) 2000.
5 The first book to
expose the story of the "comfort women" was Hicks 1995. Subsequently, the women began to speak for themselves. See Schellstede 2000; Stetz 2000; and
Yoshimi 2000.
6 This women's organization, which has
self-published its members' stories, calls itself
the Association of Camp Inmates-Canton Sarajevo,and it lists a telephone and fax number
in Bosnia at (011) 387-71-232925. The information about this source comes from Drakulic
2001.
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Yugoslavia, where intermarriage had become increasingly common and
people had really begun to see themselves as "Yugoslavs"ratherthan Serbs,
Croatians, Macedonians, and so forth. Hence, the Serb army, apparently
acting on orders, frequently forced Bosnian Serbs not just to witness the
rape and murder of their Muslim neighbors but to participate in such acts
themselves, thereby coercing Bosnia's Serbs into a complicity with Belgrade that lessened both the ability of the different groups to live together
in the future and the likelihood that any Bosnian Serb observers would
ever report the war crimes they may have witnessed being committed.
Rape became, in essence, a particularlyeffective tool for perpetrating the
kind of trauma that Kai Erikson defines as collective in its ability to inflict
"a blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching
people together and impairs the prevailing sense of communality" (1995,
103).
Yet while this explanation of mass rape and the other atrocities of the
Yugoslav wars is critical for recognizing the planned brutality of those
conflicts, it seems nonetheless too rational and arid to fully account for
the enormity of what happened in Bosnia. And although increasing the
numbers of a putatively threatened Serb population (or at least motivating
Serb men to see their actions as procreativelybeneficial to the Serb nation)
may likewise have played some role in the mass rape of Bosniak women,
there were far too many women killed immediately after being raped or
killed after becoming too debilitated to serve their purpose in a rape camp
for the production of Serb babies to work as a likely rationale. In the
Bosnian war, mass killing was up close, savagely personal, and typically
conducted in a hands-on orgy of bloodletting. Muslims were butchered
by their former Serb friends and neighbors, and murder was randomly
committed by almost anyone designated "Serb"-the remnant Yugoslav
army,controlled by Slobodan Milosevic out of Belgrade and now in effect
the Serbian army; the Bosnian Serb army controlled by Radovan Karadzic
out of Bosnia; paramilitaryvolunteers from Serbia or Bosnia; local police;
and longtime neighbors. Against the organized, dispassionate, bureaucratized logic that is the horrific signifier of Nazi-orchestrated genocide, the
savageryperpetratedin places like Foca, Manjaca,or Camp Omarskareeks
of another kind of brutality:uncontrolled, spontaneous, blood-fixated, and
so remarkablyadolescent as to suggest the existence of some unconscious
script being played out alongside the canonical one of genocide as a strategy for territorialacquisition. In an orgy of nationalism bathed in alcohol,
athletic contests, and Serbian songs, Serb soldiers threw Muslims off of
cliffs and from hotel roofs into rivers, carved Orthodox crosses into their
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chests, hacked off the arms or legs of their victims, made women clean
up the mess from such amputations, and then raped the women on top
of the blood-soaked rags.7 Even the sheer expenditure of energy required
by all this butchery overwhelms the antiseptic rationalityof "ethnic cleansing." Suddenly, Dr. Strangelove's arm jerks up. And suddenly, the psychic
space from which this violence emanates becomes recognizable as the space
of Serbian epic culture, the dark storehouse of Serbian cultural memory
that, in the wake of Tito's death, became a source for cynical politicians
looking for alternative populist myths to displace the "Brotherhood of
Yugoslavs" ideal through which Tito had reigned supreme for forty-five
years.

Serbian nationalist mythology
Everything about the Yugoslav golgotha suggests that it was written out
of a revived and newly politicized lethal combination of nationalist myth,
Christoslavic typology, and, to a far lesser extent, documentable history.
The scripts that Serb soldiers typically enacted in rape camps are instructive. According to frequently echoed testimony from female survivors, as
the usually drunken, enraged soldiers raped and beat them, the rapists
screamed either "Turkish whore" or "Ustashe whore" at their victims,
triumphantlyjeering after reaching orgasm that the woman was now carrying "Serb seed" and would produce a "Serb baby." In these assertions,
what floods in is not some credible explanation for the prevalence of rape
but the fundamental irrationalitythat defines the chief cultural fiction of
the Balkans: the fiction of difference.
What made the Bosnian war incomprehensible to most Americans was
that, while it was clear that ethnic difference-or at least the perception
of it-was a crucial issue, the obvious lack of a parallel basis of comparison
among "Serbs, Croats, and Bosnian Muslims" and what to do with "Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Croatian Serbs, Croatian Muslims, Serbian
Croats, Serbian Muslims" made the war impossible to sort out. Moreover,
the only explanation possible is one that begs its own question, and that
is that in the Balkans-and especially in Serbia-a type of racial ethnicity
is largely assumed to be synonymous with religious difference, and ethnic
identity synonymous with national boundaries. Thus Serbs denotes all
7 This
experience is depicted in Mandy Jacobson and Karmen Jelincic's searing documentary film, Calling the Ghosts(1996), which follows the experience of two women held
in Camp Omarska.
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those who belong to the Orthodox faith, regardless of whether or not
they or their ancestors ever set foot inside Serbia proper.8 But, because
ethnic identity is assumed to be synonymous with national boundaries
and those calling themselves Serbs presume hereditary connections to
Serbia just as Croats (Roman Catholics) do to Croatia, when Bosnia declared its independence from the Yugoslav federation, those "Serbs"living
in Bosnia-working fist in mail with the Belgrade government-began
loudly to claim discrimination and demand that the areas they lived in be
united with Serbia. And since "Serbs"were scattered all over Bosnia and
living cheek by jowl with or indeed married to Muslims or Croats, Serbia
began laying claim, village by village, to most of Bosnia. Underlying all this
confusion is the monumental tragic irony of the Balkans:in reality,all three
of these peoples actually belong to exactly the same racial and linguistic
group, southern Slavs. Logically speaking, the only difference among them
is a strictly religious one, and a "Serb baby" would be indistinguishable
from a "Bosnian Muslim" one.
But Serbian epic culture depends on the radical denial of precisely that
connection. When taken to the extremes of collective cultural denial, the
vision of the nation/self as involved in an ongoing epic struggle to retain
its heroic uniqueness-inevitably constructed around fantasies of racial
purity-is what allows a people to reach such euphoric heights of nationalist paranoia that it can imagine it necessary to "ethnically cleanse"
a land of its "others" when the others are, in reality, ancestrallyidentical
to the cleansers.
In ways that laid the groundwork for the blood orgies of the 1990s,
Serb national mythology has always constructed the Slavic conversion to
Christianitythat occurred sometime after their sixth-century arrivalin the
Balkans as unimpeachably valid. But the conversion of Slavs to Islam that
occurred after the late fourteenth-century Ottoman invasion is conversely
construed as a "race betrayal"that had the effect of literally transforming
those Slavswho converted to Islam into "Turks."In Kosovo, the Kosovar
Albanians are apparentlydescended (inconveniently) from the first people
to move into the Balkans, the Illyrians, who arrived in the area in about
8 B.C.E. Because such a history works out badly in terms of primary
claims, however, an entire scientific/academic/political enterprise is hard
at work in Serbia trying to establish that Albanians are not the descendents
of Illyrians but come from a mixture of various remnant groups whose
8
Orthodoxy is defined in this area of the Balkansby the Serbian Orthodox Church, just
as it is defined farthersouth by the Greek Orthodox and farthereast by the RussianOrthodox

authority.
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arrivaldates to the seventeenth century, well after that of the Serbs (Vickers
1998, 1-3). Yet while it seems clear that the Albanian Kosovarsare neither
Turksnor Slavicconverts guilty of race betrayal,within the Serb vocabulary
the mostly Muslim Albanian majorityin Kosovo (or Kosovars)can become
"Turks" almost as readily as can the Bosnian Muslims.9 As Kosovo with
its 90 percent Albanian majority became an increasingly political issue in
the late 1980s, "I'll be first, who'll be second to drink some Turkish
blood?" became a common slogan in Serbia (Cigar 1996, 57).
The sense of the irrational clings as well to the geography of the war
and the disproportionate fury that the breakup of the former Yugoslavia
unleashed against the Muslims. When the republics of Slovenia, Croatia,
and then Bosnia-already concerned by the mid-1980s about rising Serb
nationalism-withdrew from the federation they saw as devolving into
"Serboslavia,"the logic of pre-Tito history should have made Croatia the
more likely target of Serb rage. In the Croatian Ustashe death camps of
World War II, between sixty thousand and eight hundred thousand Serbs
were massacredin a systematic, clear attempt at genocide. The Serbs thus
had real, tangible, and unassuagedgrievancesagainst Croatiathat had been
rigorously suppressed under Tito but had remained vivid within collective
memory.
Yet it was Bosnia, not Croatia, that bore the brunt of Serbian rage,
and the pattern of the war maps out that displacement. Serb fury initially
erupted in July of 1991 with an invasion of Croatia, where, in a display
of awesome violence, Serb troops relentlessly leveled the defenseless city
of Vukovar.'1 But although the Croatians could at that point offer no
serious resistance, the Serb army, after a rather desultory shelling of Zagreb, made a sudden, unexpected U-turn, crossed back over the river,
and for nearly four years vented its fury on the hapless Bosnians. It was
not that memories of the Ustashe were dead or that the Serbs felt avenged
for the very real victimization they had suffered at Croatian hands: the
widespread use of Ustasheas the most pejorative term possible reflects this
still-potent anger. But in ways disjunct enough to suggest once again a
dangerous displacement at work, the epithet Ustashewas used as often
against Bosnian Muslims as against Croats, and the illogical reference to
9 Because the use of the name Kosovo
(used by Serbians) or Kosova (used by Albanians)
can be read as a political statement, I need to clarify that my choice of the "o"
spelling is
based entirely on its greater recognizability to English-speaking readers.
10 Although the Jugoslav National Army (JNA) was what this
army still called itself,
Yugoslavia by now consisted of only Serbia and a co-opted Montenegro, and thus referring
to it as a Serb army seems justified, as it was now working at Slobodan Milosevic's behest
to carve out a greater Serbia.
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Jasenovac, the most notorious of the Croatian Ustashe death camps, came
up frequently as a justifying rationale for concentration camps holding
Muslims and for the Serb massacre of Muslims at Srebrenica (Vulliamy
1996)."
The vignette that New YorkTimesEuropean Editor Roger Cohen offers
of a bus ride across the River Drina during the Bosnian war provides a
snapshot of how the past was playing out in Serb popular memory. At
each stop from Belgrade into Bosnia, a handful of Serb males boarded
the bus, grenades and Kalashnikovrifles in hand, some of them sporting
bits of their grandfathers'World War II Chetnik uniforms and others in
getups that signified the rival Partisans, and all resembling, says Cohen,
something more like a historical dress-up party than any kind of disciplined
army.Singing Serb nationalist songs and drinking slivovitz in bleary toasts,
this ragtag bunch of weekend killersraucously crossed the Drina, to debark
in some Bosnian town and spend the day killing "Turks" (Cohen 1998,
125-27).12
What surfaces in this picture and elsewhere is the figure of the Turk
at the center of Serb cultural memory, where, infuriatingly, he threatens
to conquer, victimize, feminize, and humiliate Serb national selfhood (always a masculine construct) and infantilize all Serbia's attempts to achieve
independent adulthood. Given Serbia's history of five hundred years of
Ottoman domination, the entrenchment of this figure should not be surprising, especially since the Turk also haunts the earlier literature of many
European countries that never experienced Turkish occupation. For Serbia-which has never forgotten and thus has never gotten over the
Turk-he remains an ever-internalized figure of occupation that must
11 Ed

Vulliamy, the British journalist who was responsible for locating and uncovering
Camp Omarskain 1992, went back to Bosnia in 1996 and again interviewed Milan Kovacevic,
the man who in 1992 had been the camp administrator.In a remarkablyrevealing interview,
Kovacevic begins his rationalization of Omarska by talking about his own childhood spent
in Jasenovac.When Vulliamy interjects, "But Jasenovacwas run by Croats; why did the Serbs
turn on the Muslims?" Kovacevic mutters, "There is a direct connection between what
happened to the Muslims in our camps and the fact that there had been some Muslim soldiers
in the [pro-Nazi] Greater Croatia" (Vulliamy 1996, 13). In Vulliamy's analysis, "What the
Serbs have done is to project their own obsessive 'racial memory' onto their perceived
enemies. The Serbs' inimitable cult of the victim demanded that they create victims. Their
experience of concentration camps demanded that they create concentration camps" (14).
In terms of the argument of this article, I would add that their (perceived) experience of
rape likewise demanded that they rape.
12 Cohen, too, notes the peculiarly adolescent, recreational aspects to the atrocities committed by the Serb militia. One paramilitaryunit, active in the Brcko area, was called the
"Weekenders";another, active in Prijedor, called itself the "Rambos."
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always be reconfronted, despite the fact of Turkish withdrawal from the
Balkansnearly a century ago. The consequences of this Turkishoccupation
of the Serb imaginary are evident in the statement that General Ratko
Mladic made over Serb television from the conquered town of Srebrenica,
the supposed "UN safe haven," which UN troop withdrawal essentially
abandoned to the Serb army. In the background, as the camera picks up
a column of captive Muslim men being led, as we now know, off to their
mass execution, Mladic memorializes the day to his Belgrade audience by
saying, "Here we are in Srebrenica on July 11, 1995. On the eve of yet
another great Serb holiday. We present this city to the Serbian people as
a gift. Finally, the time has come to take revenge on the Turks" (Stover
1998, 88-89).13
The internal entrenchment of this fantasized, ever-presentTurkishconqueror began, ironically enough, simultaneously with the production of
a Serb epic culture dedicated to the construction of a glorious Serbian
past that itself began almost immediately after the defeat of the Serbs at
the Battle of Kosovo Polje on June 28, 1389, a day that the Orthodox
calendarnow commemoratively marksas St. Vitus's Day. Among the states
that once formed Yugoslavia, Serbia is the one that can boast of a literary
tradition that is both truly epic and so genuinely alive on the popular level
that its songs and legends are not just known by everyone in Serbia but
sung, as well, all over the former Yugoslavia. In the midst of it all is the
central narrative of Serbian national selfhood: defeat by the Turk at the
Battle of Kosovo and a heroic masculinity kept alive by Serbia'simplacable
determination to avenge its captivity.In 1989, with Tito eight years dead,
the Soviet Union breaking up, the ideology of communism that had governed for the past half century faltering, and nationalism on the rise, a
calamitous trick of history brought around the six-hundred-year anniversary of the Kosovo defeat, and that coincidence provided Slobodan Milosevic and other ethnofascist politicians the fortuitous opportunity to
convert this Kosovo baggage into an unimpeachable rallying site for putative Serb victimization. The commemorative ceremonies that Milosevic
orchestrated for media broadcast have been described as having "all the
trappings of a coronation staged as a Hollywood extravaganza" (Milan
Milosevic 2000, 109). Apparently taking a note from Hitler's famous
descent into Nuremberg (and Leni Riefenstahl's infamous recording of
that event in Triumph of the Will [1935]), Milosevic "descended by helicopter from the heavens into the cheering crowd, the masses were the
'3 Mladic's words are quoted in English translation alongside stills from this television
broadcast in Stover 1998.
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extras. The cameras focused on his arrival.In some vague way, the commentator placed Milosevic at the center of the Serbian ancestral myth of
Prince Lazar, the hero and martyrof the Kosovo battle" (Milan Milosevic
2000, 130). On this date, within a carefully staged television spectacular
and standing on the sanctified locus of a Serb nationalism being vividly
constructed, Milosevic "for the first time explicitly mentioned the possibility of war" (Milan Milosevic 2000, 121). A month or so prior to the
broadcast from Kosovo, to revivify the aggressions built into the cultural
memory of the Kosovo defeat and imbue them with an immediacy, Milosevic and associates carted the six-hundred-year-old body of Prince Lazar, the Serb leader defeated at Kosovo Polje, through every Serb village
and town, where crowds of villagers, dressed in black, turned out to mourn
him. It was a stunningly effective tactic. For, as VamikVolkan notes, "Serbs
began to feel as if the defeat at Kosovo Polje had occurred only recently,
a development made possible by the fact that the chosen trauma had been
kept effectively alive-although sometimes dormant-for centuries"
([1997] 1998, 67). It was, says Volkan, as if "the psychological DNA of
Kosovo continued to be passed down from one generation to the next,
. . .[and] Milosevic's focus on Kosovo reactivated this DNA" ([1997]
1998, 67-68).
Not many nations celebrate a defeat as the cradle of their nationhood,
but by doing so Serbs seal their history within a mythic imaginary in
which the Serbs are forever victims, situated for perpetuity in the place
of resentment and unassuaged revenge within a story that promises to
confer heroism in the present only through return, repetition, and revenge. Yet, in terms of historical reality, the Battle of Kosovo became
the Serbs' defining myth only during the nineteenth century, when, in
the midst of one of the more successful Serb rebellions, the oral poetic
tradition was reshaped with a vastly enhanced, quasi-religious script and
finally written down by Vuk Karadzhich, who is credited with preservation of this oral tradition. While Karadzhich's role as a committed
participant in the Serb cause undoubtedly influenced the transmission,
the transcribed Kosovo legends that collectively make up the "Kosovo
Cycle" include, in a way characteristic of epic literature, a number of
historical contradictions that offer a repressed counternarrative to the
story they are intended to tell. And such contradictions create at least
the possibility of telling the story another way. The binary of Serb versus
Turk that is traditionally understood as the ideological grand narrative
of the Kosovo Cycle, for instance, suppresses a number of qualifying or
even contradictory details that the stories themselves contain-details
such as the fact that in 1389 there were a number of Serbs fighting on
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the side of the Turks; that the Albanians were allies who fought with
the Serbs in this battle; that Turks and Serbs frequently changed sides
and frequently intermarried; and that the "blood" defining the ethnic
selfhood of most modern Serbs is almost certainly itself the product of
such Serb/Turk unions.
In the official reading of the meaning of the Battle of Kosovo that
forms the core of nationalist memory, the Serb leader Prince Lazar becomes a type of Christ whose people fall into servitude for the five hundred
years after he is killed by the Muslim Turks. Needing a Judas figure to
go with Lazar's Last Supper as well as to account for Lazar's defeat, the
story situates one of Lazar's commanders, Vuk Brankovic, in the role of
traitor.And though historians unanimously argue that Brankovichas been
unjustly maligned, he is far too useful to the narrativefor his virtue to be
reclaimed. As the traitor within, he becomes a figure for those Slavs who
converted to Islam-Vuk Brankovic is, in other words, the Bosnian Muslims. Out of these various archetypal connections developed the convoluted logic that was repeatedly voiced as Serb soldiers murdered Muslims
and plundered their way across Bosnia. In killing Muslims, even ones who
are Slavic brethren, the Serb aggressor sees himself as defender of Christian
Europe: he is cleansing Europe of the infidel Turks and, by doing so,
avenging his savior's death. For through this conflation of myth and history within the cultural imaginary, not only do all Muslims become
"Turks," but through a logic built on an otherwise incomprehensible
anachronism, the Muslims (not the Jews) become those who, in killing
Lazar, killed Christ. Thus, the Bosnian Muslims are not only "Turk race
traitors" but "Muslim Christ-killers," despite the fact that neither Muhammad nor Islam came into being until seven hundred years after the
death of Jesus.'4As stand-ins for the "Turk,"the Bosnian Muslims became
targets for a violence that played out the deep-seated fear of the Turk and
the five-hundred-yearsubjugation of Serbianindependence through which
that figure is remembered.

Impalement and crucifixion
There is, moreover, a particular reason why rape should have become
unconsciously the most appropriateform for Serb revenge, and it coheres
with yet another image that seems as deeply ingrained in the Serb imaginary as is the figure of the Turk: the image of the Turkish practice of
impalement.
14

For elaboration, see especially Sells 1996b.
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Within Serb culturalmemory it is historical truth that the Turksimpaled
Serb vassals. So prevalent is the belief, in fact, that a number of wellreputed analysts of the Yugoslav wars assume that impalement happened
frequently. Slaven Letica notes the "Ottoman Turkishpractice of impaling
Serbs and Christianson stakes" and says, without listing specific examples,
that "entire portions of the mythical, cultural, and national traditions and
of popular aesthetics (national ballads) involve the motif of 'impalement
on a stake"' (1996, 95). Julie Mertus, though more cautious in locating
the impalement story as a part of nationalist literatureratherthan historical
fact, likewise asserts that "every Serbian school child knows about the
horror of impalement from national folk ballads, national novels, national
plays and other national traditions" (1999, 109).15 Yet there is no mention
of such a practice in any part of the Kosovo Cycle, and the single source
actually cited by either author is the unforgettable image from Nobel
Prize-winner Ivo Andric's 1945 novel, The Bridge on the Drina ([1945]
1959), a fictionalized narrative of the sixteenth-century construction of
the Turkish bridge at Visegrad in which a Serb peasant hero manages
temporarily to halt the building efforts before being caught and publicly
impaled on the bridge to die an excruciating death. However, according
to Nenad Filipovic, the famous scene in Andric not only is entirely fictional
but is itself the only instance in Serbian literature where Turkish impalement of a Serb occurs. While impalement was indeed practiced by the
Turks, its use was reserved exclusively for traitorous members of their own
officer corps. For Filipovic, The Bridge on the Drina-a required school
text that was read by every child in the former Yugoslavia-is the source
responsible for the belief now widely held across the Balkansin the actual
historicity of such a practice.16
Despite the ahistoricity of the impalement story, it became unquestioned in Serb collective memory because cultural memory, as Raphael
Samuel notes, "far from being merely a passive receptacle or storage
system, an image bank of the past, is rather an active, shaping force .
is dynamic" (1994, x). As such, it is frequently impervious to histori15 Mertus's otherwise excellent study is, overall, a testimony of her knowledge of the
Balkans and her skill in reading its cultural politics.
16
The information from Filipovic, a Bosniak in Turkish Studies at Princeton University,
is from private correspondence, 2001. Not only in the Balkans but in cultural imagination
across Europe, impalement exists as a particular sign of Turkish depravity despite evidence
that it was practiced in at least Austria and Hungary as well. Its most famous practitioner
was a fifteenth-century Romanian prince from Wallachia called Vlad the Impaler, later rewritten in western European narrativeas Dracula.
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cal facticity. Pure fictions that merely seem right because they enhance
the dynamics of a national myth may be readily appropriated into it and
acquire a greater perceived historical truth than any factually historical
events that would, conversely, seem to threaten it. In the Serb psyche,
impalement thus remains so vivid an experience and one that so thoroughly justifies any act of revenge that, according to Michael Sells, impalement was explicitly invoked by Bosnian Serb leaders "to justify the
attacks on Bosnian Muslims who are alleged to be Turks because of the
conversion of their ancestors to Islam" (1996b, 39). The illogic of the
connection is stunning. That Bosnian Muslims should be killed because
their ancestors converted to Islam and because Turks who practiced
Islam had, several centuries ago, supposedly impaled Serbs who may
have been ancestors of Serbs now living in Bosnia-this requires such
an enormous stretch of logic that the very fact of its invocation is telling.
Yet despite the dubious historicity of the impalement story, Andric's
appropriation of this particularform of violence so effectively guaranteed
its continued life in Serb memory that John Matthias, translator of the
Kosovo Cycle, comments that, for Serbs, Andric's scene became the
"most resonant single image . .. of the suffering endured by the Christian Slavic population during the long night of Turkish rule in the Balkans" (1987, 14). During the Bosnian war, in a frenzy of violence seemingly designed to avenge the event to which Andric's scene had given
reality, Serb units turned the bridge at Visegrad into a killing center
from which they hurled Muslims to their deaths below. Moreover, although the Serbs thundered through Bosnia destroying every monument, mosque, gravestone, bridge, edifice, or sign of the Turkish occupation, in a gesture of appreciation for Andric's empathetic depiction
of the Serb story, the one Turkish sign they left standing was the bridge
over the Drina at Visegrad-thus ironically rememorializing the scene
of Serb subjection to Turk impalement.
Andric's scene on the bridge contains, as Sells describes it, "a long,
anatomicallydetailed account of the death of the heroic Serb, with explicit
evocations of the crucifixion. The scene fits into that genre of Christian
literature that details the suffering and torments of Jesus. It is a scene that
is constantly evoked by readers of Andric as one of the most memorable
. . .in all of Andric's writings" (1996a, 132). But while a crucifixion
image does arise from what Sells chastely refers to as the "long, anatomically detailed account," the reader's experience of this scene greatly exceeds the terms of Sells's description. As Matthias says, "one feels the
shaft in one's own entrails" (1987, 15).
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In Andric's novel, the Turks first order the whole male population to
witness the execution. As the men arrive, the first objects they see, lying
ominously on the scaffold, are the instruments of impalement:
an oak stake about eight feet long, pointed . . . and tipped with
iron and . .. well greased with lard [and the peasant, who lay] as
. . . ordered, face downward. The gipsies [the designated impalers]
approached and . .. bound his hands behind his back[,] then . . .
attached a cord to each of his . . . ankles. . . . They pulled the
cords outwards and to the side, stretching his legs wide apart. Meanwhile Merdjan [the senior gipsy] placed the stake on two small
wooden chocks so that it pointed between the peasant's legs. Then
he took from his belt a . . . knife, knelt beside the stretched-out
man ... to cut away his trousers and widen the opening through
As soon as he had finwhich the stake would enter his body....
ished, [Merdjan] leapt up, took the wooden mallet and with slow
measured blows began to strike the lower blunt end of the stake.
Between each two blows he would stop . . . and look first at the
body that the stake was penetrating and then at the two gipsies,
reminding them to pull slowly and evenly. The body of the peasant,
spreadeagled, writhed convulsively; at each blow of the mallet his
spine twisted and bent, but the cords pulled and kept it straight.
. . .Those nearest could hear . . . [the] sound that the stretched
and twisted body emitted[,] a sort of ... cracking like a fence that
is breaking down or a tree being felled. At every second blow the
gipsy went over to the stretched-out body and leant over it to see
whether the stake was going in the right direction and . .. that it
had not touched any of the more important internal organs ....
[Then,] for a moment the hammering ceased. Merdjan now saw
that close to the right shoulder muscles the skin was stretched and
swollen. He went forward quickly and cut the swollen place with
two crossed cuts. . . . Two or three more blows, . . . and the ironshod point of the stake began to break through at the place where
he had cut. He struck a few more times until the point of the stake
reached level with the right ear. The man was impaled on the stake
as a lamb on the spit, only that the tip did not come through the
mouth but in the back and had not seriously damaged the intestines,
the heart or the lungs. Then Merdjan threw down the mallet and
came nearer, . . . avoiding the blood which poured out . .. where
the stake had entered and come out again. . .. The two gipsies
turned the stiffened body on its back, ... [bound] the legs to the
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foot of the stake, . . . and began to lift him up like a sheep on a
spit, [fixing and buttressing the stake] to a beam on the staging.
. .On that open space[,] raised a full eight feet upright, stiff and
bare to the waist, the man on the stake remained alone....
[The
crowd of watchers] looked dumbly at this human likeness, up there
in space, unnaturallystiff and upright. Fear chilled their entrails and
their legs threatened to give way beneath them. ... [The peasant]
was alive and conscious. His ribs rose and fell, the veins in his neck
pulsed and his eyes kept turning slowly but unceasingly. Through
the clenched teeth came a long drawn-out groaning in which a few
words could be distinguished. "Turks,Turks . .."moaned the man
on the stake. "Turkson the bridge . .. may you die like dogs .
like dogs." (Andric [1945] 1959, 46-51)
Within this agonizing description, there is, as Sells notes, a crucifixion
image, but there is surely much more. For what the male population of
Visegrad as well as Andric's readers have been compelled to witness is a
four-hour rape scene in which the rebel against Turkish rule is literally
skewered by the Turkish phallic emblem of power and then hoisted up
in the feminized image of the penetrated body, the enormous Turkish
phallus fixing in place the unforgettable picture of a grotesque and horrific
sodomy.
That impalement is always refigured in Serb cultural memory as a rape
by the Turk and the implications the issue has for the 1990s Balkan wars
become even clearer through a 1985 incident in Kosovo, the so-called
Martinovic case, which, except for the high seriousness with which it was
invested in Serbia, might more aptly have been dismissed as low comedy.
A Serb farmer named Djordje Martinovic was found in a Kosovo field
with a bottle up his backside. Initially, when discovered in this indelicate
situation, Martinovic claimed that he had been accosted by three masked
men armed with a syringe of morphine who sedated him, placed the bottle
on a stick, and sodomized him with it. When taken to the hospital, however, Martinovic admitted that there were no assailants and that he had
been his own sodomizer. By then, however, the incident had been seized
on by political nationalists, and Belgrade newspapers loudly accused the
doctors of trying to deny the history of Serb suffering by repressing the
real truth-that Martinovic had been attacked by Albanians who had then
thrust the bottle up his anus. Croatian media, from the vantage of at least
some cultural as well as geographical distance, treated the incident comically, speculating that Martinovic had been masturbating and the bottle
had slipped, or had jumped off a tree and landed on the bottle, and so
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forth (Ugresic 1998, 71). But in Serbia, the Martinovic case prompted
sufficient outrage for Slobodan Milosevic to use it as the foundation on
which to build a mountain of fictitious allegations about KosovarAlbanian
acts of "genocide" against the Serbs. These allegations-made believable
by the Martinovic incident-in turn led to a petition submitted by Belgrade intellectuals to the assemblies of Serbia and Yugoslavia in January
1986 calling for the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy ("Documents, Petition to the Assembly" 1986). The petition, which asserted that "the case
of Djordje Martinovic has come to symbolize the predicament of all Serbs
in Kosovo," ultimately gave Milosevic the green light for his crucial decision to terminate the autonomous status that Kosovo had enjoyed under
the Yugoslav federation since 1974.17 In connecting the beginning of the
Yugoslav wars with the Martinovic incident, Croatian writer Dubravka
Ugresic points with dark humor to the absurdityof that connection: "The
war on the territory of Yugoslavia began several years ago," says Ugresic,
"with the posterior of a completely innocent Serbian peasant" (1998, 71).
But what could be treated with irony by a Slav living in Zagreb was, to
Slavs in Belgrade, powerfully and collectively reminiscent of the most
extreme form of humiliation. As Slaven Letica puts it, "Impalement by a
beer bottle" became "a metaphor for five centuries . . . of Turkish acts
of impalement [and the] mythology regarding the horrors of Turkish oppression" (1996, 95).
Important to my point is the language with which the Martinovic story
was carried throughout Serbia and the way it took on a life of its own,
continuing to appear in newspapers as much as six years later, repeatedly
shifting the focus of conflict back five hundred years from the contemporary Serb-Albanian dispute in Kosovo to the still-remembered outrage
of imagined impalement by the Turks. In the crucial document produced
in 1986 by the leading Serbian intellectual institution, The Memorandum
of the Serbian Academy of Sciencesand Arts, the story of Martinovic and
17 The January21, 1986, petition, which also charged the Yugoslav authorities with at-

tempting to calm the public by covering up the incident, is reprintedin the SouthSlavJournal
and quoted in Mertus 1999 (108-9). For a detailed presentation of the legal documents and
wranglings that surrounded the case, the extensive public attention it received, and the way it
became a turning point for the fate of the whole of former Yugoslavia,see the chapter that
Mertus devotes to this case, "Impaledwith a Bottle" (1999, 98-121). In addition to its primary
function of illustratingthe fiction that Serbsin Kosovo were living under Albanianvictimization,
"the Martinovic case was singled out because the incident propelled the nationalist agenda
brewing in the mid-1980s. ... The mere utterance of the name 'Djordje Martinovic' was
enough to disprove the official notion [residualfrom the Tito days] of national harmony...
The press after Martinovic trumpeted national conflict" (107).
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his beer bottle is inflatedinto a narrative"reminiscentof the darkestdays
Three yearslater the anxieties
of the Turkishpracticeof impalement."18
of the case had not diminished,and in a February1989 edition of the
popularweekly magazine Nin, ZivoradMihajlovic(who proceeded to
writea whole book on the case)once againfound an immediateequation
with Turkishimpalement:"Here,we are dealingwith the remainsof the
OttomanEmpire,in the use of a stake, but this time one wrappedin a
bottle. In the time of the Turks,Serbswere also fixedto stakes,but even
then the Turksused their servants-the Albanians"(quoted in Cohen
1998, 149; and Mertus 1999, 109, 119).19And in January1991, only a
year before the Serb armywould invade Bosnia and turn its weapons
againstthe imagined"Turks"with a violencenot seen in Europein fifty
years,the Martinoviccase still capturedsuch headlinesas "CrimeLikein
the Timeof Turks"in PolitikaEkspres
(see Mertus1999, 109, 119). Roger
Cohen comes close to recognizingwhat I see about this incidentand its
connection to a specific,historicallyrememberedtrauma:"Thus an incidentin whichnobodywaskilledwasusedbyMilosevic'smediato awaken
the darkestspectersin the Serbianpsyche .. . [and] this humiliationof
a single Serbin a Kosovofield becamesynonymouswith five centuriesof
Turkish oppression, impalement and genocide. . . . Listening to those

gunnersabove Sarajevo,it was clearenough that the Martinovicmodel
had been reappliedin Bosnia.All the spectersof past Serbsufferinghad
been deliberatelyraisedand exaggeratedhere in Bosniato justifya war
in whichthe Serbs,consciouslyor unconsciously,usedpreciselythe methods of theirpast torturers"(1998, 150).
If the Martinoviccase needed furtherauthority,it more than received
it from the importantSerb artist,Mica Popovic.Popovic'spainting(fig.
18
Kosta Mihailovic and VasilijeKrestic (1995) include a reprint of the entire 1986 memo,
and this quotation from it falls on their page 129. See also Cohen 1998, 149; Mertus 1999,
109, 119.
19 It is worth noting the way that the Nin writer's hatred of the Albanian Kosovarshere
seems to make him misremember the scene in Andric's novel that he implicitly invokes. In
Andric, the impaler-the "servant" to Turkish orders-is not an Albanian but a gypsy. In
the Balkans'standoff between Serb and Turk or Serb and Albanian, the gypsies (Roma) have
alwaysoccupied an unenviable position in the middle. In Andric's novel, they serve the Turks
and help to torture the Serbs. During the 1999 expulsion ofAlbanians, the gypsies remained
in Kosovo, where, again in compliance with the group in power, they aided the Serbs in the
expulsion. Subsequently, however, NATO bombing changed the power equation. As Albanian Kosovars returned to their homes from exile and Serb civilians began fleeing north with
the Roma close behind, the Roma found themselves turned back at the border to Serbia,
denied entry as undesirable others, and forced to remain in Kosovo to face the wrath of the
returnees.
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Figure 1 Mica Popovic, May 1, 1985

1), which purports by its title, May 1, 1985, to illustrate the real truth of
what had happened in that Kosovo field, went on display in a prominent
Belgrade gallery and was seen by well over a million people.20They came
by busloads and stood in lines to be enraged by its spectacular fusion of
Christ's suffering and Djordje Martinovic's mythologized impalement on
a beer bottle. In the iconography of Popovic's painting, the beer bottle
20

This reproduction of the Popovic painting appears in Samardzic et al. 1990, 319.
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rests beneath the cross while malevolent figures wearing traditional Albanian headgear substitute for the Roman soldiers lowering Christ from
the cross and a Yugoslav soldier in a uniform of the Tito era presides over
the event, holding in his hands a nightstick that, given the particularsof
the Martinovic story, suggestively implicates the communist regime in the
crime of Serb victimization.
The image thus condemns not only the Albanians but a sitting Yugoslav
government depicted as protecting its ethnic minorities at the expense of
the victimized Serbs-a government that badly needs to be replaced with
the kind of state that Milosevic implicitly promised in his infamous 1989
speech in Kosovo, where he stoked the growing anti-Albaniannationalism
with his promise (and its implicit reference to the Martinovic incident)
that Serbs "will never be beaten again." Through Popovic's painting, the
Martinovic incident was framed within the same Christoslavic model of
religiously fervid suffering that underlies the Serbs' core version of their
history: Djordje Martinovic, whose trials add new material to the defining
national narrative of Serb victimhood and reaffirm Serb claims to the
highly contested territory of Kosovo, now apparentlyjoins Prince Lazar
as a type of Christ, the spear in the side replaced by the bottle up the
backside, and Martinovic's agony now justifying revenge and conferring
mystical beatitude on the Serb atrocities of both the Bosnian and the
Kosovar wars.

Rape as imagined reciprocity
The invocation by Bosnian Serb leaders of the historicity of impalement
as rationale for the contemporary killing of Muslims and the way the
Martinovic case recalled that same narrativeoffer strong hints of the dark
specters of cultural memory lying behind some of the least explicable and
most brutal aspects of Serb aggression in Bosnia. This narrative of reciprocal revenge for a mythologized impalement is likewise what explains the
peculiar defacement in Ron Haviv's striking photograph of a portrait of
a Bosnian Muslim family. Having fled Sarajevo before the siege was fully
in place, the family returned to their home in 1996 to find that occupying
Serb militia had taken every stick of furniture, windowpane, baseboard,
and piece of electrical wiring. Only one item remained, a defaced photograph. With a sharp instrument the Serbs had scraped away the faces
of all four family members. Still not satisfied, they marked the photo with
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yet another act of violence-four carefully placed slash marks that deftly
impale each of the four figures (fig. 2).21
Within Serbian culture, the excessively invested image of male rape/
impalement evokes an overdetermined memory of historical subjugation
and an enraged sense of masculine humiliation that together suggest why
the patterns of violence in this war were so especially those of rape and
genital mutilation. In a particularlyinfamous incident from Omarska that
came to trial at the Hague but ended in acquittal because the witness
became too terrified to testify, Serb guards forced two Muslim prisoners
to hold a third man upright in the position of the crucified Christ while
a fourth prisoner was made to bite off his testicles (Vranic 1996, 292).22
Even the obsessive pursuit of a "greater Serbia" that has driven Serb
national policy for centuries suggests phallic insecurities, and these same
anxieties resonate in the words of the Serb national anthem and the peculiar way that song played its own part in the Serbian genocidal script.
As Muslim men in captured villages were lined up with their hands over
their heads, awaiting probable execution, they were made to sing the Serb
anthem, which opens with the defiant assertion: "[He] lies who says that
Serbia is small." In a vivid acting out of the castration of Muslim culture,
the Serb army rampaged through Bosnia, decapitating Muslim minarets
and mosques, and, through such visual castrations, compelled the enemy
Muslims psychologically to feel-and daily to observe signs of-their own
impotence.23

Given the determining power of the impalement myth and the way it
encodes the Turkish conqueror's rape of Serbian masculinity, it might
seem that rape of the enemy male rather than female would more logically
accomplish reciprocity. Indeed, testimonial evidence suggests that, in addition to genital mutilation, the rape of Muslim men may also have been
frequent. In a relatively small sample of interviews conducted in refugee
camps over a few months, Montenegrin journalist Seada Vranic found six
men willing to admit that they had been raped, and she suspected that
This photograph of the portrait appearsas the final picture in the main text of Haviv's
powerful collection of Bosnian and Kosovar war photographs (2000, 175).
22
According to Vranic, variouslyhorrific forms of castrationwere a favorite form of camp
torture, virtually all of them ending in death.
23
In connection with the interethnic conflict on Cyprus during the 1960s, when Greek
Cypriots exploded dynamite in the minarets of Turkish towns, VamikVolkan notes that "the
damage was inescapably suggestive of castration: with the top gone the minaret looked like
a big phallus with the top removed. It made a symbolic focal point for the narcissistichurts
of the Turks, who had largely unconsciously felt that their phallic aggression and drive for
success had been circumvented" (1988, 128).
21
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Figure 2 Ron Haviv, from Blood and Honey: A Balkan WarJournal (Haviv 2000, 175).
Reprinted by permission of VII Photo Limited, Paris.
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the numbers were actually higher (1996, 292).24 But even within the
reports of male rape, there is a pattern that suggests that the more psychologically satisfyingform of Serb revenge was not the direct, unmediated
one but one that was buffered by symbolic structures and displaced into
an elaborated triangulation. Vranic's transcription of the testimony of a
man called Faruk is, in this regard, illuminating.
After a group of Serb irregularsarrived at Faruk's farm, the senior one
sent the others off on a fictitious errand and then forced Faruk into the
cowshed, where he raped him, mocking him as he did, "What happened
Turk? You're deflowered?" Again, the Turk. Of the six male rapes that
Vranic cites, this was one of five done in secret (1996, 292). Especially
inside a world where brutality was strongly applauded, the fact that five
of the six rapistswanted to keep their actions secret from their peers argues
for a culture that reads homosexual penetration-even if enacted within
the macho display of rape-as degradingly effeminizing for both participants, and the impetus for secretly raping other males within these norms
would seem weighted toward guilty desire rather than cultural vengeance.
For Faruk's rapist, the enactment of triumphal revenge and the violent
display of cultural dominance came later that night within a collective
performance of male bonding enacted through rape but reconstructed
within a symbolic displacement.
Initially, the Serb soldiers tried to humiliate Faruk by forcing him to
sexually penetrate a sheep. Beaten unconscious for refusing, Faruk was
awakened later that night by the excruciating pain of an iron pole being
pushed into his backside, again by the senior soldier. This time, the sexual
violence was formulated as a group act involving all ten Serb soldiers'
pinning him to the ground and collectively jeering, "Turk." In this reenacted impalement/rape, not only was the category of private/collective
reversed, but the underlying male-male dynamic, no longer unmediated,
was, through the pole, displaced to the symbolic. Likewise in the detention
While rape of male prisoners in war is something that we can assume occurs, it is a
subject cloaked in a powerful silence. According to a footnote in Campbell 1998, "accounts
can be found in 'Thousands of Men Raped in Bosnia: A Taboo on War Reporting,' abridged
translation from Le Nouveau Quotidien 10-12 March 1995, in BosNews(Digest 211), 13
March 1995; and in a Reuters report in Tribunal Watch,3 July 1996" (274, n. 116). Female
the
rape, on the other hand, seems to be an issue of inexhaustible interest, especially to
military and the media. During the Gulf War,the American print media energeticallyengaged
in salacious speculation over whether any of the American women pilots held as POWs by
Iraqi troops had been raped. Yet while women POWs were decidedly fewer than their male
counterparts, the possibility that any of America's fighting sons might have been similarly
abused was never so much as hinted at.
24
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camps, while some Muslim men were no doubt raped by their guards,
the favored sexual performance of dominance and humiliation was one
that again removed the Serb aggressor from the ambivalent site of homosexual desire. Instead of physicallyperforming the role of rapist themselves, Serbs forced Muslim males to rape other Muslim men in shows in
which "camp guards compel[led] inmates to engage in sexual acts with
each other. It was the favourite form of entertainment of the camp staff
in Manjaca and the commander of the camp, along with his staff, seldom
failed to attend these performances" (Vranic 1996, 292). Not only was
the rape victim's degradation enhanced by turning rape into a public
performance where the victim was mocked by jeering spectators, but the
camaraderieamong the Serb spectators was enhanced by the power they
enjoyed as collective voyeurs. For the Serbs, the strategy would yield two
benefits: it would both strengthen their own bonds and vitiate the bonds
among the Muslim men by forcing them to become not merely victims
of the Serbs but also victims and victimizers of one another.
Since rape occurs in all wars, it is a universal and, by inference, must
be viewed as such. Yet according to general consensus, rape during the
Bosnian war exceeded any normalized model and thus cannot really be
explained by it. What I have argued is that Serb rape of Bosniak women
should be theorized within a culture-specific explanation and recognized
as a projection that has its origins inside of the powerfully invested narrativesof Serb cultural memory. And what I have also argued is that within
that storehouse lies the humiliating memory of rape by the Turk. Like
both of the collective and triangulated displacements above, the widespread rape of "Turk" women in this war should also be understood as
a displacement of the unmediated vengeance of male-male rape. Translated
by these terms, crossing the Drina to create rape camps and subject
Bosnia's Muslim women en masse to the authority of the Serb phallus
not only enacts a repetition and a return to subjugate the omnipresent
Turk but tries to reciprocate the humiliating violation of male impalement/rape inside of a revised and improved script. Moreover, despite its
substitution of the targeted victim, it works as commensurate reciprocation, and it works precisely because, in constructing women's bodies as
property signifying the honor of the male community, patriarchalculture
has produced the equation that makes this substitution possible. Through
the tactical deployment of rape, Serb aggressions during the Yugoslavwars
made visible a bitter irony inherent in the relationship among rape, patriarchy,and the vulnerabilityof a culture to the devastation of its identity:
the more patriarchalthe culture, the more vulnerable it becomes, because
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all the more likely are the women within it to become targets for enemy
rape.
Department of English
Dartmouth College
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